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Duncan Pritchard 
 
I have struggled with the problem of radical skepticism for many years. 
Epistemic Angst (Princeton University Press, 2015) opens by saying that this 
problem is both my first love, philosophically speaking, and my true love. It 
was certainly this puzzle that got me hooked into philosophy, and it was this 
puzzle that I found myself returning to at regular intervals. In earlier 
workespecially Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005)I tried to 
meet the difficulty head-on, by offering a form of neo-Mooreanism that was 
motivated by epistemic externalism and situated within a research program I 
referred to as anti-luck epistemology.1 The careful reader of this book will have 
spotted, however, that I was not fully persuaded, in that the anti-skeptical 
proposal on offer starts to look very much like a “skeptical solution” once the 
details are unpacked. Indeed, I found myself arguing in effect that a form of 
radical skepticism that is aimed specifically at the rational standing of our 
beliefs was pretty much correct. 
Over the years, my response to radical skepticism became increasingly 
bifurcated. On the one hand, I developed an anti-skeptical theory (the essentials 
of which were already present in Epistemic Luck) that was inspired by 
Wittgenstein’s (1969) remarks on the structure of rational evaluation in On 
Certainty.2 Simultaneously, I also advanced a separate proposal, inspired by John 
McDowell’s (e.g., 1995) work, which was cast along epistemological 
disjunctivist lines. On the face of it, these two proposals are radically different. 
Nonetheless, I was convinced that they belonged together, though at the outset 
I couldn’t quite see how to connect them. Fortunately, since each of these 
                                                 
1  I submit that anti-luck epistemology is still going strong, even though I now realize 
that it doesn’t contain the materials to deal with radical scepticism. That is, I now 
realize that the philosophical task of offering a theory of knowledge is orthogonal to 
the philosophical challenge of showing whether, contra the radical skeptic, we have any 
knowledge. In any case, I claim that anti-luck epistemology is adequate to the former 
task, as part of a wider view I call anti-luck virtue epistemology (or, more recently, anti-risk 
virtue epistemology). For more on anti-luck epistemology in general, see Pritchard (2005a; 
2007; 2015a). For more on anti-luck virtue epistemology, see Pritchard, Millar & 
Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4) and Pritchard (2012a). For more on anti-risk virtue 
epistemology, see Pritchard (2016; forthcoming).  
2  Henceforth referred to as ‘OC’. 
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theories is highly contentious in its own right, it was inevitable that I only ever 
presented work on one of the two positions at any given time, and so I could 
gloss over the issue of how these two parts of my overall anti-skeptical view 
related to one another. (Occasionally, however, someone who had heard a 
recent talk of mine on the other proposal would challenge me to explain 
myself.) 
I’m not quite sure exactly when the epiphany occurred, but it was certainly 
while working on the book that would be published as Epistemological 
Disjunctivism (Oxford University Press, 2012) that I saw the light. Very roughly, 
epistemological disjunctivism is the view that when it comes to paradigm cases 
of perceptual knowledge, the rational support available to the subject is both 
reflectively accessible and factive. In particular, one’s reflectively accessible 
rational basis for knowing that p can be that one sees that p, where seeing that p 
entails p. As far as epistemological orthodoxy goes, such a position is held to be 
straightforwardly incoherent. 
The goal of Epistemological Disjunctivism was to explain why this position, far 
from being the utterly mad proposal that many in contemporary epistemology 
suppose it to be, is in fact perfectly defensible. This point is crucial because, as I 
also argued in this book, epistemological disjunctivism is a stance that is rooted 
in our ordinary epistemic practices, and would be highly desirable if true. 
Accordingly, if the philosophical reasons why we have rejected this natural 
position turn out to be dubious, such that it is a live theoretical option after all, 
then a powerful case can be made that we should embrace it. 
Since epistemological disjunctivism is such a contentious position, one of 
the self- imposed constraints I operated under in that monograph was that I 
would defend the view by appealing only to further claims that ought to be 
acceptable to all epistemologists. This meant that when I got to the point in the 
book where I demonstrate the anti-skeptical potential of the view, it simply 
wasn’t an option to bring in Wittgenstein’s radical account of the structure of 
rational evaluation, as most epistemologists would regard such a view as highly 
contentious. Instead, epistemological disjunctivism was obliged to stand on its 
own two feet. The result was a new kind of neo-Mooreanism, this time set 
within a provocative form of non-classical epistemic internalism rather than 
epistemic externalism. But I was acutely aware that the anti- skeptical story I 
was telling was incomplete in a fundamental way, and that the full solution lay 
in integrating epistemological disjunctivism with the Wittgensteinian proposal. 
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In order to understand why, we need to revisit a debate that occurred in the 
literature just over a decade ago, and which I was fortunate to play a (relatively 
minor) part in. This concerned the logical structure of radical skeptical 
arguments, and in particular whether the formulation of radical skepticism that 
turns on a closure-style principle is logically distinct from a superficially very 
similar formulation of radical skepticism that turns on what is known as an 
underdetermination principle. My own contribution to this debate, such as it 
was—see Pritchard (2005a, pt. 1; 2005b)—was to defend the claim that these 
epistemic principles are logically distinct, and that this may have important 
implications for the debate regarding radical skepticism. It was only when I was 
writing Epistemological Disjunctivism, however, that I came to the view that the 
logical difference between these two epistemic principles is in fact profoundly 
important for our understanding of the two formulations of the skeptical 
argument. 
In particular, I came to realize that this logical difference reveals that these 
two formulations of radical skepticism, while superficially similar, are in fact 
arising out of different sources. Underdetermination-based radical skepticism is 
trading on a specific point about what I call the insularity of reasons— roughly, 
how the rational support our worldly beliefs enjoy, even in the best case, is 
compatible with their widespread falsity. In contrast, closure-based radical 
skepticism trades on a very different claim, which is what I call the universality of 
rational evaluation—roughly, that there are no in principle limits on the extent to 
which our beliefs can be rationally evaluated, such that universal rational 
evaluations are entirely possible. Once one understands how these two 
formulations of the skeptical argument arise out of different sources, then it 
becomes apparent why the logical differences between the two epistemic 
principles on which they turn are so important. In particular, what one 
discovers is that these two formulations of the skeptical argument really 
constitute distinct skeptical problems that require distinct solutions. 
By recognizing this point, I was able to get a handle on just what is right and 
what is unsatisfying about epistemological disjunctivism from the perspective 
of radical skepticism. This proposal confronts the insularity of reasons thesis 
head-on, and demonstrates that such a thesis, far from being common sense, is 
in fact the product of dubious philosophical theory. As such, epistemological 
disjunctivism is the antidote to underdetermination-based radical skepticism. 
But if one applies this idea, ungarnished with Wittgenstein’s insight about the 
structure of rational evaluation, to closure-based radical skepticism, then one 
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gets an extremely epistemically immodest (and hence unpalatable) proposal, one 
that contends that we can have a factive rational basis for dismissing radical 
skeptical hypotheses. 
How does the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational 
evaluation help on this score? Well, the core thought in this account is that the 
very idea of a fully general rational evaluation—whether of a negative (i.e., 
radically skeptical) or a positive (i.e., traditional anti- skeptical, such as 
Moorean) nature—is simply incoherent. Instead, Wittgenstein argues that it is 
in the very nature of a system of rational evaluation that it takes certain basic 
commitments— the “hinge” commitments, as he called them—as immune to 
rational evaluation. Surprisingly, these hinge commitments can be regarding 
such apparently mundane propositions as that one has two hands. According to 
Wittgenstein, it is only with these hinge commitments in the background that 
rational evaluation is even possible. The upshot is that rational evaluation is an 
essentially local phenomenon. Moreover, this is not because of some incidental 
lack on our part (e.g., a lack of imagination or consistency), but rather reflects 
the very nature of what is involved in rational evaluation. (As Wittgenstein 
expressed the matter, his point was about the “logic” of rational evaluation.) 
The challenge posed by the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of 
rational evaluation is to explain what purchase, exactly, it offers us on the 
skeptical problem. On my reading of Wittgenstein, the thought is that it gains 
us a very good grip on closure-based radical skepticism by offering us 
principled grounds for rejecting the universality of rational evaluation thesis. 
Crucially, however, my reading of Wittgenstein enables us to reject the 
universality of rational evaluation thesis without thereby rejecting the closure 
principle, thereby ensuring that the view can retain all of our commonsense 
epistemological commitments. As I argue, our hinge commitments, properly 
understood, are simply not the kind of propositional attitude to which the 
closure principle (again, properly understood) is applicable. It follows that the 
Wittgensteinian rejection of the universality of rational evaluation is entirely 
consistent with the closure principle, since the latter simply does not apply to 
our hinge commitments. 
This point is very important to the undercutting credentials of this form of 
anti-skepticism. Wittgenstein was certainly very keen to offer a response to the 
radical skeptical problem that demonstrated that it was a puzzle that was arising 
out of dubious philosophical claims that are masquerading as common sense. 
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According to Wittgenstein, the radical skepticism problem is really a product of 
faulty philosophical theory, rather than representing a genuine paradoxical 
tension in our most fundamental epistemic commitments. The skeptical 
“paradox” is thus undercut, in that it is shown to not be a bona fide paradox at 
all (this is as opposed to the paradox being overridden, which is when a genuine 
paradox is resolved by offering a plausible form of philosophical revisionism). 
If the closure principle is a highly intuitive principle, then it is all to the good as 
far as an undercutting anti- skeptical proposal goes that it does not involve the 
denial of this principle. 
We can now see how the Wittgensteinian proposal, when understood in the 
right way, can help epistemological disjunctivism with its response to radical 
skepticism. Whereas epistemological disjunctivism is focused on the 
underdetermination-based formulation of radical skepticism, which trades on 
the underlying insularity of reasons thesis, the Wittgensteinian proposal is 
instead aimed at the closure-based formulation of radical skepticism, which 
trades on the underlying universality of rational evaluation thesis. The crux of 
the matter is that if we can combine these proposals, then potentially we can 
offer a unified treatment of radical skepticism that deals with both formulations 
of the problem. 
Can we combine these proposals? On the face of it, they look very different; 
indeed, they look antithetical, and competing (and are often taken to be so). 
Whereas the Wittgensteinian proposal emphasizes the locality of rational 
evaluation, and hence the locality of rational support, the McDowellian 
proposal emphasizes the strength of the rational support available to us in 
paradigm conditions, in that it is factive. But these differences are superficial. In 
fact, these proposals work very well with each other, in that they are not only 
compatible, but also mutually supporting and philosophically in the same spirit. 
The compatibility claim is just the idea that the supposed tension between 
these views is merely superficial. There is nothing in the idea of rational 
evaluation being essentially local that precludes the possibility of factive rational 
support in the perceptual case. And there is nothing in the idea of factive 
rational support that excludes the possibility that all rational evaluation is local. 
Once one recognizes the compatibility of these two theses, then one can see 
how they might be combined, and how, in particular, they might be employed 
to support each other. The basic idea is that each proposal is more plausible 
when combined with its sister view. So, it is easier to live with the essential 
locality of rational evaluation if one is also able to demonstrate that paradigm 
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cases of perceptual rational support are factive. And it is easier to live with the 
idea that paradigm cases of perceptual rational support are factive if one 
embraces the essential locality of rational evaluation (i.e., because one is not 
thereby committed to the epistemic immodesty of supposing that one can have 
a factive rational basis for dismissing radical skeptical hypotheses). Note too the 
extent to which these proposals are in the same spirit. We have already seen 
that the Wittgensteinian proposal is an undercutting treatment of the skeptical 
“paradox.” But note that this also applies to epistemological disjunctivism, in 
that the guiding idea behind this view is that we have been seduced, on faulty 
theoretical grounds, into regarding a dubious theoretical claim (regarding the 
insularity of reasons) as an item of mere common sense. Both of the 
formulations of the skeptical 
problem in play, whether closure-based or underdetermination-based, are 
thus shown to be merely pseudo-problems. 
I call the unified defense against radical skepticism the biscopic proposal. It is, 
admittedly, an ugly name—I have tried hard to find a better moniker but 
without success. But, despite its ugliness, it does convey the bare essentials of 
the proposal. This is that we have, completely unbeknownst to us, been looking 
at this problem through, as it were, only one eye—only one eye at a time 
anyway—and that we need to use both of our philosophical “eyes” in order to 
see the problem aright. Only then can we gain the right perspective on the 
problem and thereby recognize what the correct solution to the problem must 
be. 
A final comment is in order about the very notion of epistemic angst. The 
problem of radical skepticism has always been a very real existential issue for 
me, and so I do not use this terminology lightly. Discovering that the skeptical 
problem has no clear answer is something that should unsettle any responsible 
inquirer. Note, though, that while I believe the solution I offer to the skeptical 
problem genuinely is a remedy for epistemic angst, this is not to say that the 
anxiety in question will be entirely removed. This is because I think there is an 
inevitable psychological vestige of skeptical doubt that remains even once the 
solution has been embraced (albeit not one that is now tracking a genuine 
epistemic angst about one’s epistemic situation). 
I call this psychological state epistemic vertigo (or epistemic acrophobia, if one 
wants to be pedantic), in order to capture the idea that it is essentially a kind of 
phobic reaction to one’s epistemic predicament. Just as one can suffer from 
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vertigo when high up, even while fully recognizing that one is not in any 
danger, so I think that even after the problem of radical skepticism has been 
resolved, and hence the epistemic risk posed by this problem is defused, it can 
nonetheless be the case that one feels a residual unease about one’s epistemic 
situation. The reason for this disquiet is embedded in the Wittgensteinian 
account of the structure of rational evaluation itself. For what Wittgenstein 
alerts us to is how one’s apparently very ordinary commitments— such as that 
one has two hands— can be playing a quite striking role in the system of 
rational evaluation. Wittgenstein wrote that our hinge commitments “lie apart 
from the route travelled by inquiry” (OC, §88). He means that the question of 
their rational standing simply never arises in normal conditions, and so we are 
unaware that these ordinary commitments play an extraordinary epistemic role. 
Once one has inquired into their rational standing, however—and the stimulus 
for this inquiry will almost certainly be philosophical in naturethen it is hard 
not to continue to be struck thereafter by their peculiarity. 
Another way of putting this point is that while in everyday life we do not 
take it as given that universal rational evaluations are possible—indeed, we 
don’t consider the issue at all—neither do we recognize that they are 
impossible. That’s not to say that we don’t recognize that our everyday 
practices of giving reasons for and against particular claims is local, as we surely 
do recognize this. The crux of the matter is rather that our practices of rational 
evaluation, while local, also seem to be entirely open to indefinite broadenings 
of scope. That is, there seems no inherent limits to the scope of rational 
evaluation, even if in practice it is always local in nature. That there is such an 
inherent limit—that a fully general rational evaluation, one that encompassed 
even our hinge commitments, is impossible—is a philosophical discovery. 
Moreover, in discovering it, we also realize that our everyday epistemic 
practices disguise this fact. It is thus unsurprising, then, that even once 
epistemic angst has been removed, epistemic vertigo might well remain, for we 
now have a perspective on our practices of rational evaluation that is in a 
certain sense completely unnatural. We have, as it were, epistemically 
“ascended” and adopted a vantage point that we would not normally adopt. 
From this unnatural vantage point, epistemic vertigo is a natural response. 
My point is that one can accept that there is a genuine phenomenon of 
epistemic vertigo without thereby conceding anything of substance to the 
radical skeptic. Epistemic angst is avertedthis is no skeptical solution of 
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radical skepticism. But as with any engagement with a deep philosophical 




Nicola Claudio Salvatore - Two Worries on Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst 
 
1. The Cartesian skeptical paradox. 
 
The feature of Cartesian style arguments is that we cannot know certain 
empirical propositions (such as ‘Human beings have bodies’, or ‘There are 
material objects’) as we may be dreaming, hallucinating, deceived by a demon or 
be “brains in the vat” (BIV), that is, disembodied brains floating in a vat, 
connected to supercomputers that stimulate us in just the same way that normal 
brains are stimulated when they perceive things in a normal way. 4  Therefore, 
as we are unable to refute these skeptical hypotheses, we are also unable to 
know propositions that we would otherwise accept as being true if we could 
rule out these scenarios. 
Cartesian arguments are extremely powerful as they rest on the Closure 
principle for knowledge. According to this principle, knowledge is “closed” under 
known entailment. Roughly speaking, this principle states that if an agent 
knows a proposition (e.g., that she has two hands), and competently deduces 
from this proposition a second proposition (e.g., that having hands entails that 
she is not a BIV), then she also knows the second proposition (that she is not a 
BIV). More formally: 
  
The “Closure” Principle 
 
If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby coming 
to believe that q on this basis, while retaining her knowledge that p, then S 
knows that q5. 
                                                 
3  This précis is an abbreviated version of the introduction to Epistemic Angst.  
4 See Putnam (1981). 
5  This is essentially the formulation of the Closure principle defended by Williamson 
(2000, 117) and Hawthorne (2005, 29). 
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Let’s take a skeptical hypothesis, SH, such as the BIV hypothesis mentioned 
above, and M, an empirical proposition such as “Human beings have bodies” 
that would entail the falsity of a skeptical hypothesis. We can then state the 
structure of Cartesian skeptical arguments as follows: 
(S1) I do not know not-SH 
(S2) If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know M 
(SC) I do not know M 
  
Considering that we can repeat this argument for each and every one of our 
empirical knowledge claims, the radical skeptical consequence we can draw 
from this and similar arguments is that our knowledge is impossible. 
 
 
2. Wittgenstein on scepticism; a minimal reading. 
 
A way of dealing with ‘Cartesian style’ skepticism is to deny the premise S1) 
of the skeptical argument, thus affirming contra the skeptic that we can know 
the falsity of the relevant skeptical hypothesis. 
For instance, in his “A defence of commonsense” (1925, henceforth DCS) and 
“Proof of the external world” (1939, henceforth PEW), G. E. Moore famously 
argued that we can have knowledge of the ‘commonsense view of the world’, 
that is of statement such as ‘Human beings have bodies’, ‘There are material 
objects’ or ‘The earth existed long before my birth’ and that this knowledge 
would offer a direct response against skeptical worries.   
Wittgenstein wrote the 676 remarks published posthumously as On Certainty 
(1969, henceforth OC) under the influence of DCS and PEW, and in particular 
in the context of conversations he had about these papers with his friend and 
pupil Norman Malcolm6. 
 As I have briefly mentioned supra, according to Moore, it is possible to 
provide a direct refutation of Cartesian-style skepticism, thus claiming contra the 
skeptic that we can know the denials of skeptical hypotheses. 
                                                 
6 While writing OC Wittgenstein was also heavily influenced by Henry Newman’s 
lectures on religious beliefs (see Newman 1844, 1870-1985). For a more detailed 
analysis of the relationship between Newman’s and Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical 
strategies, see Pritchard (2000). 
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But, Wittgenstein argues, to say that we simply ‘know’ Moore’s ‘obvious 
truisms’ is somewhat misleading, for a number of reasons. 
Firstly (OC 349, 483), because in order to say ‘I know’ one should be able, 
at least in principle, to produce evidence or to offer compelling grounds for his 
beliefs; but Moore cannot ground his knowledge-claims with evidence or 
reasons because (OC 245) his grounds aren't stronger than what they are supposed to 
justify. As Wittgenstein points out, if a piece of evidence has to count as 
compelling grounds for our belief in a certain proposition then that evidence 
must be at least as certain the belief itself. This cannot happen in the case of a 
Moorean ‘commonsense certainty’ such as ‘I have two hands’ because, at least 
in normal circumstances, nothing is more certain than the fact that we have 
hands (Pritchard, 2014). As Wittgenstein writes in OC: 
 
If a blind man were to ask me “Have you got two hands?” I should not 
make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don’t 
know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn’t I test my eyes by 
looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What should be tested 
by what?  (OC 125). 
 
Imagine, for instance, that one attempted to legitimate one’s claim to know 
that p by using the evidence that one has for p (for example, what one sees, 
what one has been told about p and so on). Now, if the evidence we adduced 
to support p was less secure than p itself, then this same evidence would be 
unable to support p: 
  
 My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything 
that I  
  could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position to 
take the sight of my hand as evidence for it (OC 250).  
 
Moreover, Wittgenstein argues, a knowledge-claim can be challenged by, for 
instance, the appeal to evidence and reasons; more generally, when we 
challenge a knowledge claim we can recognize what and if something has gone 
wrong in the agent’s process of knowledge-acquisition. Things are somewhat 
different in the case of the denials of Moore’s ‘obvious truisms of the 
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commonsense’; if, for instance, I believe that I am sitting in my room whilst I 
am not, there are no grounds on which this belief could be explained as a 
mistake, as an error based on negligence, fatigue or ignorance. On the contrary, 
a similar ‘false belief’ would more likely be the result of a sensorial or mental 
disturbance (OC 526). As Moyal-Sharrock points out (2004, 74), in fact, for 
Wittgenstein if someone was holding seriously a denial of Moore’s ‘truisms’ 
(i.e., she believed she had no body or that both her parents were men) we 
would not investigate the truth-value of her affirmations, but instead her ability 
to understand the language she is using or her sanity (OC 155).   
If Moore’s ‘commonsense certainties’ are not knowable, they are 
nonetheless   immune from rational doubt. This is so, argues Wittgenstein (OC 
310) because doubts must be based on grounds; that is, they have to be internal 
to a particular practice and must be in some way or another justified. If they 
aren’t, they are constitutively empty. To illustrate this point, Wittgenstein gives 
the example (OC 310) of a pupil who constantly interrupts a lesson, 
questioning the existence of material objects or the meaning of words; far from 
being a legitimate intellectual task, the pupil’s doubt will lack any sense and will 
at most lead to a sort of epistemic paralysis, for she will just be unable to learn 
the skill or the subject we are trying to teach her (OC 315).  
Accordingly, as per Wittgenstein, all reasonable doubts presuppose certainty 
(OC 114-115); that is, the very fact that we usually raise doubts of every sort at 
the same time shows and implies that we take something for granted. For 
example, a doubt about the real existence of an historical figure presupposes 
that we consider certain an ‘obvious truism of the commonsense’ such as, ‘The 
world existed a long time before my birth’; a doubt about the existence of a 
planet presupposes the absence of any doubt about the existence of the 
external world and so on (OC 114-115, 514-515). 
Not knowable or doubtable, as per Wittgenstein Moore’s ‘commonsense 
certainties’ are ‘hinges’; a term he uses on different occasions, as in OC 341-3, 
where he writes:  
 
“The question that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that 
some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were the hinges on 
which those turn [….] that is to say, it belongs to the logic of our 
scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted [...] If 
I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put”. 
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That is to say, ‘hinges’ are just apparently empirical contingent claims; on 




3. Pritchard’s anti-skeptical strategy 
 
 With this points in mind, we can now turn our attention to Pritchard´s anti-
skeptical strategy in Epistemic Angst .(2015). 
To understand his proposal, recall the following remark we have already 
quoted supra: 
 
If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning 
of your words either […] If you tried to doubt everything you would not 
get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes 
certainty (OC 114-115). 
 
As per Pritchard, here Wittgenstein would claim that the same logic of our 
ways of inquiry presupposes that some propositions are excluded from doubt; 
and this is not irrational or based on a sort of blind faith, but rather belongs to 
the way rational inquiries are put forward (see OC 342)7. As a door needs 
hinges in order to turn, any rational evaluation would require prior commitment 
to an unquestionable proposition/set of ‘hinges’ in order to be possible at all.  
A consequence of this thought (2015, 102) is that any form of universal 
doubt such as the Cartesian skeptical one is constitutively impossible8; there is 
simply no way to pursue an inquiry in which nothing is taken for granted. In 
other words, the same generality of the Cartesian skeptical challenge is based on 
a misleading way of representing the essentially local nature of our enquiries. 
  A proponent of Cartesian skepticism looks for a universal, general 
evaluation of our beliefs; but crucially there is no such thing as a general 
evaluation of our beliefs, whether positive (anti-skeptical) or negative 
                                                 
7  Cfr OC 342: […] it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are 
indeed not doubted. 
8 See OC 450: “A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt”. 
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(skeptical), for all rational evaluation can take place only in the context of 
‘hinges’ which are themselves immune to rational evaluation.  
An important consequence of Pritchard’s proposal is that it will not affect 
Closure. Each and every one of our epistemic practices rests on ‘hinges’ that we 
accept with a certainty that is the expression of what Pritchard calls ‘‘hinge’ 
commitment’: an a-rational commitment toward our most basic belief that, as 
we mentioned above, is not itself opened to rational evaluation and that 
importantly is not a belief. 
 As we have seen, this commitment would express a fundamental a-rational 
relationship toward our most basic certainties, a commitment without which no 
knowledge is possible. Crucially, our basic certainties are not subject to rational 
evaluation: for instance, they cannot be confirmed or dis-confirmed by 
evidence and thus they are non-propositional in character (that is to say, they 
cannot be either true or false). Accordingly, they are not beliefs at all. This can help 
us retain both the Closure principle and our confidence in our most basic 
certainties. Recall the reformulation of the Closure principle we have already 
encountered supra: 
 
The Competent Deduction Principle 
 
 If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby coming 
to believe that  q on this basis, while retaining her knowledge that p, then S 
knows that q . 
 
The crucial aspect of this principle to note (2015, 90- 102) is that it involves 
an agent forming a belief on the basis of the relevant competent deduction; the 
idea behind Closure is in fact that an agent can come to acquire new knowledge 
via competent deduction, where this means that the belief in question is based 
on that deduction. Accordingly, if we could not rule out a skeptical scenario 
such as the BIV one, we would be unable to know Moore’s ‘obvious truisms of 
the commonsense’ such as, ‘Human beings have bodies’ or ‘There are external 
objects’ and thus, given Closure, we would be unable to know anything at all. 
But our most basic certainties are not beliefs; rather, they are the expression 
of a-rational, non-propositional commitments. Thus, the skeptic is somewhat right in 
saying that we do not know Moore´s ´obvious truisms of the common sense 
´and that , also, we cannot know whether we are victim of a SH or not ; but this 
will not lead to skeptical conclusions, for our ‘hinge commitments’ are not 
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beliefs so they cannot be objects of knowledge. Therefore, the skeptical 
challenge is misguided in the first place9.  
 
 
4. Epistemic vertigo and epistemic relativism. 
 
  However, even if we agree with Pritchard that a general evaluation of 
our beliefs is somewhat impossible and self-refuting there is still another deep 
concern that the ‘hinge commitment strategy’ has to face. Recall that following 
this proposal, all our epistemic practices are essentially local in nature and rest 
on unsupported ´hinge commitments´. 
 If this approach can help us to block the skeptical challenge it will 
nonetheless have a cost, that Pritchard calls epistemic vertigo : 
 
´´In short, it is one thing to quite properly employ an essentially local 
system of rational  evaluation without ever recognizing that it is 
essentially local, and another thing entirely to  come to realize that 
one’s system of rational evaluation is local in this fashion (even if one is 
 at the same time convinced that systems of rational evaluation are 
by their nature local). Elsewhere, I have referred to this intellectual 
anxiety induced by radical skepticism, even when in possession of an 
undercutting solution to the problem, as epistemic vertigo.   
 
Roughly, the idea is that a by-product of the very process of engaging 
with radical ‘ skepticism, even when successfully engaging with this 
problem, is that it involves a kind of   
 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that Pritchard’s reflections on ‘hinges’ are only a part of a more 
complex anti-skeptical framework.; the other part is called epistemological disjunctivism 
, that while primarily meant to address the únderdetermination-based´skeptical 
challenge and not the Closure-based one, does nonetheless support his treatment of 
Cartesian skepticism. To present and discuss the merits of Pritchard’s epistemological 
disjunctivism would go beyond the scope of this essay and is thus not a task I shall set 
myself here. 
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reflection—a kind  of epistemic ascent, if you will—that can induce 
intellectual anxiety […} Our engagement with the problem, and the 
associated epistemic ascent, leads us  to  seek an overall 
perspective on our epistemic position, and this generates intellectual 
  
 
anxiety. But even once we are assured that there is nothing to fear and 
that our  epistemic  position is as secure as one might 
reasonably expect (and certainly not  subject to the  specific threats 
outlined by the radical skeptic anyway), the anxiety might well remain´´ 
(2015, 185, 186, my italics).  
 
That is to say, when skeptical arguments are not in play, we do not realize 
the fact that our epistemic practices are made within the boundaries of a 
number of a-rational ´hinge commitments´ and that a general evaluation of our 
beliefs is impossible; still, when dealing with Radical skeptical scenarios, we do 
realize that our epistemic practices are all local in nature. If from a side this will 
block the skeptical challenge, by showing us that the kind of universal 
evaluation of our beliefs proposed by the skeptic is constitutively self-refuting, 
it would nonetheless have a cost; namely, it will lead us to the recognition of 
the fact that any kind of epistemic evaluation is local  and, more importantly, 
rest on ungrounded ´hinge commitments´not open to epistemic evaluation. 
This might lead, and indeed does lead, not only to a sort of intellectual 
discomfort, but more seriously to a sort of anxiety with regard to our epistemic 
status. As Pritchard writes at some point:  
 
 ``Given that such natural intellectual inclinations underlie the 
ascent to skepticism-friendly  reasoning, it should be no wonder that our 
recognition that the kind of rational support at  issue in a universal 
rational evaluation is unavailable can have such a giddying effect, even 
 once we explicitly disengage the detached epistemic perspective 
from the attempt to  undertake universal rational evaluations. Natural 
aspirations are hard to shake, and one  cannot in any 
straightforward way unlearn what one has discovered about one’s 
epistemic  position. If reason cannot alter our hinge commitments, 
then it is unsurprising that it is also  unable to completely eradicate our 
naturally arising anxieties, whether they be phobias like  acrophobia or 
intellectual anxieties like epistemic vertigo. So even though there is a cure 
 available for epistemic angst, there is also a sense in which angst 
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of a certain kind—that is,  epistemic vertigo—may remain even once 
the cure has been swallowed ´´ (2015, 187-188) 
 
In other words, Pritchard recognizes the fact that while reason cannot 
undermine our confidence in our basic, a-rational hinge commitments, at the 
same time reason cannot completely undermine the ´epistemic 
discomfort´caused by the recognition of the fact that a general evaluation of 
our beliefs is constitutively impossible and, more importantly, that all our 
epistemic practices rest on unsupported ´hinge commitments´that are not in 
the market for epistemic evaluation of any sort. 
According to Pritchard, this epistemic vertigo is not completely irrational; to 
the contrary, is rooted in a number of very legitimate and understandable 
concerns about our epistemic status. However, its significance is more 
psychological than philosophical, let alone epistemic; at the end of the day, what 
matters is that , by recognizing the local nature of our epistemic practices, we 
are able to rule out skeptical worries and at the same time to keep our 
confidence in our everyday knowledge claims.  
At this stage, comes my first worry against this anti-skeptical strategy; is it 
really the case that epistemic vertigo has little to no epistemic significance, and  
is thus just the result of an  understandable but misguided, attempt to attain a 
general evaluation of our beliefs? 
Under skeptical scrutiny, we are forced to admit that all our epistemic 
practices rest on ungrounded presuppositions which are not open to epistemic 
evaluation of any sort. When skeptical hypotheses are in play, we are then 
forced to admit that all our knowledge rests on nothing but a-rational 
presuppositions such as habit, instinct and social or cultural commitments.  
Accordingly, Pritchard’s ‘hinge-commitment’ anti-skeptical strategy might lead 
to a more subtle form of Humean skepticism which undermines our confidence 
in the very rationality of our ways of inquiry.  
This point leads to another objection that might be raised against Pritchard’s 
strategy. Consider the following entries of OC : 
 
I could imagine Moore being captured by a wild tribe, and their 
expressing the suspicion that he has come from somewhere between the 
earth and the moon. Moore tells them that he knows etc. but he can’t 
give them the grounds for his certainty, because they have fantastic ideas 
of human ability to fly and know nothing about physics…(OC 264). 
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 Is it wrong for me to be guided in my actions by the propositions of 
physics? Am I to say  I have no good ground for doing so? Isn't precisely 
this what we  call a 'good ground'?  Supposing we met people who did not 
regard that as a telling reason. Now, how do we  imagine this? Instead of 
the physicist, they  consult an oracle. (And for that we consider  them 
primitive.) Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? - If we 
call  this "wrong" aren't we using our language-game as a base from which to 
combat theirs? And  are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there 
are all sorts of slogans which  will  be  used to support our proceedings. 
Where two principles really do meet which cannot be  reconciled with on 
another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic (OC  608-611). 
 
  In the ‘Moore and the Wild tribe’ example mentioned above, the agents do 
not disagree over a particular thesis but rather on the very concept of ‘evidence’ 
and of what is epistemically relevant to the dispute. Moore believes in modern 
physics and more generally in the, so to say, scientific view of the world; the 
tribe does not consider physics as a telling reason and consults oracles instead. 
In Pritchard’s jargon, Moore and the tribe belong to different epistemic 
communities in which different ‘local hinge commitments’ are in play.   
As per Pritchard (2010)10 his account of hinge commitment’ would also 
represent a viable solution to the dispute between ‘Moore and the Wild Tribe’ 
and more generally between communities committed to different worldviews; 
this is because, he argues, given the local nature of our enquiries, all our 
epistemic disputes occur within a shared backdrop of basic ‘hinge 
commitments ‘ (such as ‘Human beings have bodies’ and ‘There are external 
objects’), and also because our commitments toward our most basic ‘hinges’ 
can nonetheless change, for instance when new information arise.  
Still, even if both Moore and the Tribe share ‘ hinge commitments’ such as 
‘There are external objects’ and ‘Human beings have bodies’ (which would at 
least prevent disagreements on these ‘basic certainties’) they are nonetheless 
                                                 
10 Pritchard does not explicitly discuss this issue in (2015) but applies a similar 
´Wittgenstein inspired´proposal to the problem of epistemic relativism in his 
(2010);hence, I am not sure whether the latter work still represent his views . However, 
for reason that will be clear below, I am convinced that the anti-skeptical account 
proposed in (2015) might still lead to unpalatable relativist conclusions.  
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committed to different  ‘local’ commitments; Moore considers physics as a 
telling reason while the tribe does not. 
But crucially, as our ‘ hinge commitments’ are nothing but a-rational 
certainties not opened to epistemic evaluation of any sort, we would have no 
rational basis to solve the epistemic disagreement between Moore and the tribe 
and more generally between communities with different ‘Local hinge 
commitments’. Thus, the ‘hinge commitment’ strategy would lead to the 
epistemic incommensurability thesis, that can be states as follows: 
Epistemic Incommensurability thesis 
 
 Is it possible for two agents to have opposing beliefs which are 
rationally  justified to an  equal extent where there is no rational basis 
by which either agent could properly persuade  the other to revise 
their view (Pritchard, 2010, 5) 
 
 That is to say, if our epistemic practices are all based on a-rational 
commitments, than  every epistemic community could legitimately hold its own 
practices, as they all rest on commitments that are both unquestionable and a-
rational, thus outside any form of epistemic evaluation; accordingly, this 
proposal would license a form of epistemic relativism for which it would be 
impossible to solve disagreement between epistemic agents with radically 






In this paper, I have argued that Pritchard´s anti-skeptical strategy , and 
especially his account of ´ hinge-commitments´ , might lead to two unpalatable 
consequences. This is sop because this proposal can undermine both our 
confidence in the rationality of our epistemic practices and license an untenable 
form of epistemic relativism11.  
 
 
                                                 
11 For a general evaluation of a number of contemporary ´Wittgenstein-inspired´´ 
anti-skeptical proposals, see also  Salvatore (2015, 2017). 
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Michael Veber - Can Hinge Epistemology Close the Door on Skepticism? 
 
In Epistemic Angst, Duncan Pritchard offers a “biscopic” approach to the 
problem of skepticism. Against closure-based skeptical arguments, he defends 
an epistemic theory grounded in remarks from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. 
Against underdetermination-based skeptical arguments, Pritchard offers his 
version of epistemological disjunctivism. The combination of these two 
approaches, Pritchard tells us, overcomes skeptical epistemic angst “without 
thereby conceding anything of substance to the radical skeptic.” 12 I disagree.  
 
Hinge Epistemology is a Version of Skepticism. 
G.E. Moore felt certain of a bunch of things. Most famously: here is one 
hand (and here is another).13 But also: that he is wearing clothes and not naked, 
that he is speaking in a fairly loud voice and not singing, that there are other 
people in the room, that there are windows in that wall and a door in this one,14 
that he has never been very far from the surface of the earth, that he was born 
at a certain time in the past, that his body was much smaller back then, and that 
the earth existed for many years before that.15 This list goes on but I’ll stop 
there.  
According to Wittgenstein, Moorean certainties are not ordinary objects of 
knowledge. Instead they function as “hinges”. They are not subject to rational 
evaluation. Rather, they function as background constants that make all rational 
evaluation possible in the first place. The door moves but the hinge stays put.  
As Pritchard sees it, our hinge commitments express propositions and thus 
have truth values but they are not objects of belief. Since they are not beliefs, 
they are not knowledge either. A hinge commitment might resemble knowledge 
or belief in certain ways but, being immune to rational evaluation, it does not 
qualify.  
                                                 
12 Pritchard, (2015, p.7).  
13 Moore (1939). 
14 Moore (1993).  
15 Moore (1925). 
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Most of the Moorean certainties listed above would be examples of what 
Pritchard calls “personal hinge commitments”. These are ways of codifying the 
“über-hinge commitment” that we are not massively mistaken in our beliefs. 
Assuming normal circumstances, how could I be wrong about any of the things 
on Moore’s list unless I am somehow massively deceived on more or less 
everything else? As Wittgenstein puts it in one place, to question a Moorean 
certainty is to impugn the very nature of evidence.16 In between the personal 
and the über-hinge is a third type, the “anti-skeptical hinge commitment”. 
These are the negations of various skeptical hypotheses: that I am not a brain in 
a vat, that the world was not created by God five minutes ago, etc.17  
The closure-based skeptical problem arises because it seems we have no way 
of knowing that far out skeptical hypotheses are untrue. Yet we seem to know a 
great many propositions that we also know are logically incompatible with 
those skeptical hypotheses. So if I know the one, how come I cannot know the 
other?  Why can’t I simply deduce that the earth was not created by God this 
morning from my knowledge that Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz in 
1805? 
Plausible closure principles on knowledge allow that one can come to know 
what he competently deduces from something else he knows. But remember, 
the denials of skeptical hypotheses are hinge propositions and hinge 
propositions are never objects of belief. So one cannot arrive at belief in the 
denial of a skeptical hypothesis by deducing it (competently or otherwise) from 
an item of everyday knowledge. Whereof one cannot believe, thereof one 
cannot deduce. It isn’t that closure fails, it’s that it is simply inapplicable. And 
thus one kind of skeptical problem is solved.  
Or is it? It is very odd, to this epistemologist anyway, to think any view that 
entails Moorean certainties are not objects of belief—and therefore not objects 





                                                 
16 Wittgenstein (1969, § 188). 
17 Prtichard (2015, p.94-98). 
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Consider the following argument.  
 
1. This is a hand is a hinge commitment.  
2. Hinge commitments are not knowable.  
3. Therefore, I do not know this is a hand.  
 
The same argument would apply to any of Moore’s certainties—e.g., I am 
wearing clothes, there are windows in that wall and a door in this one, I am not 
currently singing—as well as any others he forgot to list. It is a consequence of 
Pritchard’s view that I do not know any of these things. There will be 
presumably non-hinge propositions that are knowable on Pritchard’s view 
(though I don’t find too many examples of them in the book).  So the type of 
skepticism we end up with here is not as radical as some more familiar varieties. 
But it is a very radical version of skepticism nonetheless. Prittgensteinian 
epistemology offers not a refutation of skepticism but a new argument in favor 
of it. When a door closes (and a hinge stays put) a window opens.  
 
 
An Odd Pairing 
 The skeptical nature of hinge epistemology also makes for an odd pairing 
with epistemological disjunctivism, at least to my palate. Epistemological 
disjunctivism has it that “in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge the 
knowledge enjoys a support that is both factive and reflectively accessible.” 
(124) But most of what I thought were paradigm cases of perceptual 
knowledge—here is a hand, for example—turn out not to be knowledge at all 
once I adopt the Prittgensteinian framework. So I don’t know how to tell 
whether epistemological disjunctivism accounts for paradigm cases of 
perceptual knowledge because, if I adopt that framework, I no longer know 
what a paradigm case of perceptual knowledge is.  
Abominable Conjunctions 
 
Unlike that of Dretske and Nozick, Pritchard’s view does not involve 
denying the most plausible closure principles on knowledge. But even so, his 
view still inherits what some see as the most absurd consequence of closure 
denial, namely, its commitment to “abominable conjunctions”. 
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 Consider again the hypothesis that God created the universe just this 
morning. The negation of this is an anti-skeptical hinge commitment and thus 
unknowable.  Therefore the following consequence results:  
 I know that Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz a couple hundred 
years ago but, for all I know, the universe came into existence right before I 
made my coffee today.       
In a footnote, Pritchard says that these kinds of abominable conjunctions 
“merely highlight the point that the scope of one’s rational evaluation does not 
extend to one’s hinge commitments” and once we become “appraised of the 
Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation” they are no 
longer puzzling.18 But I am still puzzled.  
 
To see why, consider the following argument: 
 
1. Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz a couple hundred years ago.  
2. If Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz a couple hundred years 
ago, then the universe did not come into existence right before I made 
my coffee today.    
3. Therefore, the universe did not come into existence right before I 
made my coffee today.  
 
Since hinge commitments express propositions, there is no obstacle to my 
knowing the logical form of this argument. Thus I know that it is valid. The 
first premise is an ordinary item of historical knowledge. The second premise 
contains a hinge commitment as the consequent of a conditional. But the 
conditional itself is an obvious necessary truth. There is no possible way the 
antecedent can be true and the consequent false. And I recognize that this is so 
even if the consequent is not subject to rational evaluation on its own. In other 
words:  
I know the above argument is valid and that its premises are true but I don’t 
know whether its conclusion is true.  
                                                 
18 Pritchard (2015, p.214).  
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Do I know that the above argument is sound? On the one hand, I know 
that any valid argument with true premises is sound. And I know that the above 
argument is valid and has true premises. But then we have: 
I know that the above argument is sound but I don’t know whether it has a 
true conclusion.  
And yet I also know it is impossible for a sound argument to fail to have a 
true conclusion.  
One might deny that I know the argument above is sound. But that won’t 
help things much. Because then:  
I know that the above argument is valid and that it has true premises but I 
don’t know whether it is sound.  
It would appear that Prittgensteinian hinge epistemology preserves 
epistemic closure in letter but not in spirit.19   
One might try to avoid the problem here by denying that I know the 
conditional premise above. But that is to deny that I know an obvious a priori 
truth and thus it makes this proposed solution to the problem of skepticism 





While it is not the most extreme version out there, the view Pritchard offers 
is nonetheless a very radical form of skepticism. This makes it a poor fit with 
epistemological disjunctivism. And, although the view does not deny any 
plausible epistemic closure principles, it ends up entailing the same kinds of 







                                                 
19 The examples involving validity and soundness are what I call “logical 
abominations”. For a discussion of how this sort of abominable conjunction plagues 
Dretske’s account of knowledge see Veber (2013).  
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Rodrigo Borges - On Pritchard’s ‘Epistemic Angst’ 
 
‘Epistemic Angst’ (Pritchard, 2016)20 is yet another display of Duncan Pritchard’s 
epistemological breadth and insight. The subtitle of the book gives its readers, a 
clue of the epistemological trouble they are in with Pritchard latest offering -- 
‘Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.’ The message is 
clear: the book is not for the epistemologically faint of heart. And Pritchard 
faithfully delivers on this promise: fırst, he concedes so much to the skeptic he 
makes us fear we will not be able to ever defeat her; second, he provides direct 
rebuttals of skeptical arguments in their strongest form. The fırst move high- 
lights how radical the skeptical problem Pritchard is considering actually is. If the 
skeptic is right, our empirical beliefs are completely devoid of any actual (as opposed 
to apparent) rational basis – it is a big philosophical deal. Pritchard claims the 
skeptical threat actually causes him, personally, to feel angst. As readers, we believe 
him, and we are given no reason to doubt the seriousness of the matter anywhere 
in book. Pritchard’s attack on the two skeptical arguments he considers (i.e., a 
closure-based argument and an underdetermination-based argument), on the 
other hand, seems to be not only proportional to the scope of the skeptical 
threat, but it also seems to go as deep as it is necessary in order to extirpate those 
threats. The scope of either threat is nothing short of all our empirical 
knowledge and it has two different sources: the insular nature of the reasons we 
have for our empirical beliefs and the universal nature of the rational evaluation of 
beliefs. According to the fırst source of skepticism, the reasons we have for our 
empirical beliefs are insulated from the external world in that we may have them 
even if what we believe about the external world is false. This source fuels the 
underdetermination-based argument for skepticism. According to the second 
source of skepticism, on the other hand, our practice of assessing the epistemic 
worth of our beliefs is fully general – any belief may be assessed along those lines. 
This source fuels the closure-based argument for skepticism. 
For Pritchard, the way to stop the underdetermination-based argument of 
skepticism is to show that the common sense credentials of this idea are rotten. 
Epistemological disjunctivism, the thesis that the rational support for one’s empirical 
belief is factive and open to reflective access, is the antidote to this version of the 
problem, we are told. As for the closure-based argument for skepticism, the 
                                                 
20 Unless otherwise noted, all page references are to this work. 
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antidote, says Pritchard, is to be found in Wittgenstein’s insights about the 
structure of rational evaluations developed in On Certainty (1969). 
Each anti-skeptical strategy seeks to undercut the skeptical threat by showing that 
the paradox they engender is not really a paradox. This type of strategy is to be 
preferred to an overriding strategy in which one seeks to show that there is a 
reason independent of the paradox itself to disregard one or more of the claims 
in the paradoxical set. As a theoretical bonus, Pritchard seeks to marry both anti-
skeptical strategies by arguing that what seems immodest about the 
disjunctivist’s part of the story (i.e., her insistence that we have reflective access to the 
factive grounds of our empirical beliefs) is in reality a feature of rational evaluation 
in general – namely, that all rational evaluation presupposes some basic 
commitments that are themselves immune to (rational) evaluation (i.e., 
Wittgenstein’s ‘hinge propositions’). He calls this theoretical marriage the biscopic 
proposal. 
In addition to outlining the main argumentative threads of Epistemic Angst, I 
hope the tone of the previous paragraphs also imparts the fact that I am, on the 
whole, sympathetic to Pritchard’s take on the issue of radical skepticism. I am 
also truly impressed by the ambition of Pritchard’s project and the philosophical 
dexterity and elegance with which he manages to make the whole thing hang 
together. I do, however, have some concerns about Pritchard’s rejection of what he 
calls ‘modest externalism’ (a version of process reliabilism). In the remainder of this 
paper I will present those concerns. 
Pritchard considers a simple form of process reliabilism as a response to the 
closure-based versions of the skeptical paradox and argues that it faces a dilemma.21 
Which horn impales the externalist depends on whether her view takes a more or less 
‘revisionist’ form. I will argue that this dilemma against the externalist does not 
succeed; at least not in the version featured in the book. 
 
Pritchard discusses two versions of the skeptical paradox based on the closure 
principle: one suggesting skepticism about knowledge and another suggesting 
skepticism about the rational grounding of such knowledge. Here’s the 
paradoxical set of claims about knowledge: 
 
                                                 
21 He also considers what is roughly the same form of process reliabilism as a response 
to the underdetermination-based version of the skeptical paradox (p.32-6) and says it 
too is impaled by this dilemma. 
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(CKV) 
(I) One is unable to know the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses. 
(II) The closure principle for knowledge (i.e., If S knows that p, and S 
competently deduces from p that q, thereby forming a belief that q on 
this basis while retaining her knowledge that p, then S knows that q). 
(III) One has widespread everyday knowledge. 
 
One of the responses to (CKV) Pritchard (p.20) considers is a simple version of 
externalism, process reliabilism, which says that  (I) should be rejected because our 
beliefs in the denial of radical skeptical hypotheses are caused by a (conditionally) 
reliable belief forming method (i.e., deduction from empirical proposition we also 
know). What is more, according to the externalist this is enough to give us 
knowledge of the denial of radical skeptical hypotheses. According to her, this 
knowledge does not require rationality, which is itself understood as requiring 
reflective access to what grounds one’s knowledge. This view contrasts with 
internalist views that take knowledge to be rationally grounded and to require that 
the subject have reflective access to what grounds her knowledge. Pritchard argues 
that the internalist has an advantage over the externalist be- cause people intuitively 
think that knowledge is rationally grounded. Hence, he proposes that the 
externalist response to (CKV) faces the following dilemma necessitated by this 
intuition concerning the rational grounding of knowledge 
(p.21-25). 
 
(D1) Either the externalist endorses a modest form of revisionism of our 
epistemic practices or 
(D2) or the externalist endorses a far more radical form of revisionism of 
our epistemic practices. 
 
According to Pritchard, the externalist who embraces (D1), ends up offering 
‘no response at all to the skeptical problem.’ The externalist who embraces (D2), 
on the other hand, ends up with a view that is ‘so discontinuous with our ordinary 
epistemic practices, that even the most ardent proponent of epistemic externalism 
would fınd it unpalatable’ (p.21-2). Following Pritchard, call the type of externalism 
implicated in (D1) ‘modest externalism’ and the type of external- ism implicated in 
(D2) ‘immodest externalism.’ 
I am not sure I fully understand what Pritchard means by ‘epistemic practice’ 
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in this context but he seems to be referring to our inclination to see all in- stances 
of knowledge as being rationally grounded and for those grounds to be reflectively 
accessible to the subject. In that sense, modest externalism endorses a modest form of 
revisionism of this practice because although it accepts the idea that all instances of 
knowledge are rationally grounded, it rejects the idea that those grounds are 
reflectively accessible to the subject. The immodest externalist, in turn, rejects both 
ideas relating knowledge and rational support in the relevant epistemic practice– 
hence, the accusation that this view is utterly ‘discontinuous with our ordinary 
epistemic practices.’ But, if the problem with immodest externalism is one of 
rejecting a central intuition about knowledge, what is the problem with modest 
externalism? Here is the fırst diffıculty I have with the dilemma for externalism: I 
am not sure what the problem is supposed to be for modest externalism. 
Pritchard says that the problem with modest external- ism is that it cannot handle 
the following version of the skeptical paradox for rationally grounded knowledge: 
 
(CRV) 
(I) One is unable to have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of 
radical skeptical hypotheses. 
(II) The closure principle for rationally grounded knowledge (i.e., If S has 
rationally grounded knowledge that p, and S competently deduces from p 
that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her 
rationally grounded knowledge that p, then S has rationally grounded 
knowledge that q). 
(III) One has widespread rationally grounded everyday knowledge. 
 
Now, I understand, of course, that (CRV) is paradoxical, but I do not see 
why modest externalism has any problem handling it. Given that the modest 
externalist thinks that all knowledge is rationally grounded, it follows that modest 
externalism handles (CRV) if and only if it handles (CKV): since there is no 
knowledge that is not rationally grounded, according to the modest externalist, 
(CRV) does not present modest externalism with a challenge that was not already 
present in (CKV). As far as modest externalism is concerned, both paradoxes 
stand or fall together. So, (CRV) does not seem to present modest externalism 
with a problem it cannot answer; at least no more than (CKV) does, and the 
modest externalist had already offered an answer to (CKV). One may disagree 
with modest externalist’s claim that reliably deducing the denial of skeptical 
hypotheses from other propositions one knows rationally grounds one’s 
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knowledge in the denial of those hypotheses, but we cannot say that the modest 
externalist has nothing to say about (CRV). 
Perhaps what Pritchard means is this. The notion of rationality featured in 
(CRV) presupposes the thesis about rational support that moderate externalists 
reject (i.e., the thesis according to which the rational grounds for knowledge need to 
be reflectively accessible to the subject), and that is why moderate externalism has 
nothing to say about (CRV).22
 
In so far as we do not make being able to 
reflectively access one’s rational grounds a necessary condition on having those 
grounds (more on that later), this interpretation of (D1) would distinguish (CRV) 
from (CKV) and open up logical space for the claim that modest external- ism fails to 
solve the skeptical paradox presented by (CRV) even if it successfully takes care of the 
skeptical paradox presented by (CKV). Unfortunately, this version of (D1) suffers 
with its own problems, leaving the modest externalist with little or no reason to 
worry about the soundness of her anti-skeptical strategy. 
What does it mean, exactly, to say that rational grounds for knowledge need to 
be reflectively accessible to the subject in order for his knowledge to count as 
rationally grounded? As far as I can see, there is no answer to this question in 
‘Epistemic Angst.’ Moreover, a quick look at the obvious ways in which one might 
cash out this notion lead to less than encouraging results for Pritchard’s case 
against moderate externalism. For one thing, having a ground reflectively 
accessible to one is neither clearly necessary nor clearly suffıcient for knowing. It is 
a well-known cognitive trait of highly skilled professionals that their skill allows 
them to know things even though they are not able to reflectively access any 
grounds for this knowledge. For instance, veteran fırefıghters can sometimes know a 
room in a burning building will collapse right before it does but they have no 
idea why they think that it would; they of course know that this knowledge is an 
indirect result of their training but there is no specifıc ground they can reflectively 
access and that rationally grounds their knowledge.23 This suggests that being able 
to access one’s grounds reflectively is not necessary for rationally grounded 
                                                 
22 Compare (p.33), where Pritchard comes very close to saying that our epistemic practices 
presuppose the idea that our rational grounds for knowledge are reflectively accessible. 
23 Note that I am not saying that there is no ground on which the fırefıghter’s 
knowledge is based. The point is merely that he has no reflective access to that ground. 
See (Kahneman, 2011, ch.22) for a review and discussion of the relevant experimental 
fındings in psychology, including the research with fırefıghters. 
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knowledge. Although the non-suffıciency of a condition is always hard to prove 
(one can always argue that the target condition is satisfıed but some other 
condition isn’t), some cases may be plausibly taken to suggest that having 
reflective access to what rationally grounds one’s belief add nothing (or almost 
nothing) to the epistemic status of one’s belief. For instance, suppose I believe truly 
(but before I check the results) that my lottery ticket lost solely on the basis of the 
odds of that happening. One might plausibly say that I have a non-gettiered 
justifıed true belief that my ticket lost. What would accessing my grounds via 
reflection add, epistemically speaking, to this belief? It seems that it would not move 
me any closer to knowing that my ticket lost or to improving the epistemic status 
of this belief in any noticeable way.24 
One may insist that, even if this is right, it is still true that in the contexts in 
which the skeptical paradoxes are salient, one counts as having rationally grounded 
knowledge only if one is able to reflectively access one’s grounds. In fact, it might be 
said that having a rationally grounded knowledge and being able to reflectively 
access the ground of one’s knowledge are one and the same thing in those contexts 
(p.33). Would this reply help Pritchard’s case against modest external- ism? It’s not 
clear that it would. For one thing, we might respond by saying that identifying 
the two notions, in any context, conflates two different things: it conflates S has a 
ground/reason for p with S is in a position to know she has a ground/reason for p. Granted, 
being in a position to know that something is one’s ground for knowing p might 
(sometimes) be an improvement on merely knowing that p (perhaps it puts one 
in a better position to fend off misleading evidence),25 but that is different from 
saying that the latter is identical to the for- mer. To deny that would be like saying 
that I have no money in my bank account because I do not have one million dollars 
in my bank account. The latter is quite an improvement on my current bank 
account (actually, it’s a huge improvement on any bank account I have ever had!), 
but they are not the same thing. 
There is also a more basic issue lurking in the background here. The 
                                                 
24 5Pritchard’s way of dealing with lottery cases such as this is, of course, to say that the 
possible world in which my ticket won is close enough to the actual world so as to 
make my true belief in the actual world unsafe. As far as I can see this way of looking at 
things is compatible with saying that I have a un-gettiered justifıed true belief in the 
proposition that my ticket lost. See, e.g., Pritchard (2012), Pritchard (2014). 
25 See (Borges, 2015) for the claim that such an improvement exists. 
  Book Symposium  145 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 41, n. 1, pp. 115-165, jan.-mar. 2018. 
suggestion is that knowledge is rationally grounded if the grounds are reflectively 
accessible to the subject. This way of talking about rational grounds for knowledge 
raises a few questions. For example, I think my (soon to be) three-year-old son sees, 
and thereby knows, that the toy in his hands is green – we practice naming the colors 
of objects everyday, and he’s pretty good at it. Moreover, I think his knowledge is 
rationally grounded – that’s what reliable vision and a rudimentary (but reliable) 
mastery of color concepts will give you when used properly. However, I am quite 
certain that the rational grounds of my son’s knowledge are not reflectively 
accessible to him. He is not able to use complicated concept such as reliability or even 
seeing in introspection; he is not even able to answer simple questions such as ‘Can 
the toy be green and red all over?’, a question any adult who masters those color 
concepts is capable of using in reflection. So, it seems that unless we want to say 
(quite implausibly, I think) that my son’s knowledge is not rationally grounded, we 
should not identify the question of my son’s knowledge being rationally grounded 
with him being able to reflectively access the rational grounds of his knowledge.26 
But maybe this is too fast. It may be argued that Pritchard’s goal is to fend off 
skepticism with respect to mature, or adult knowledge; the requirement on 
knowledge, that its grounds are reflectively accessible, does not apply to children or to 
supermarket doors.27 Fair enough, but now the question is: does this 
requirement apply to mature, sophisticated adult knowledge? Before we look for 
an answer to this question, however, we need to make a couple of points explicit. In 
order to succeed, the contention that rationally grounded knowledge requires 
grounds to be reflectively accessible needs to satisfy two constraints. First, the 
grounds knowers are able to reflectively access must actually rationalize their 
knowledge. If this constraint on what grounds need to be reflectively accessible 
                                                 
26 One may be inclined to reply in the following way. ‘Although your son is not able now to 
reflectively access his grounds for knowing that the toy in his hands is green, he will 
eventually be able to do that in the future and that is enough for his knowledge to count as 
rationally grounded now.’ The idea here is that my son counts as being able to reflectively 
access the grounds for his knowledge because he will have what it takes to access those grounds 
in the future, even if he does not have what it takes to do that right now. I do not think this 
suggestion works, however. It seems clear that the knowledge my son has today about the 
color of his toy is rationally grounded even if he were to die tomorrow, thus thwarting his 
hopes of having reflective access to anything in the future. 
27 Compare p.22. 
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were not in place, then one would have to say, implausibly, that it is possible for S to 
have rationally grounded knowledge that p even though she has reflective access 
not to ground, g, that actually rationalizes her knowledge, but only to a poor 
ground, g*, that does not rationalize p for her. In other words, unless this 
constraint is in place, there is no point in insisting that reflectively accessing those 
grounds is what rationalizes one’s knowledge. Second, in order to count as having 
rationally grounded knowledge S must be disposed, when in the right 
circumstances, to reflect on the grounds of her knowledge in an epistemically 
appropriate way: the fact that I am able to reflectively access that which grounds my 
knowledge cannot contribute to this knowledge’s rationality if I am disposed to 
reflectively access those grounds using, say, motivated reasoning or guesswork. 
With these constraints in mind, we can return to the issue of how to think about 
the requirement of reflective accessibility on (mature or adult) knowledge. 
One idea is to say that one is able to reflectively access one’s grounds for 
knowing if one satisfıed some sort of counterfactual condition such as if S were to 
reflect on her knowledge that p, she would take g to be her ground for believing that p. The worry with 
this sort of analysis of reflectively accessible grounds is that it might fall prey to what Robert 
Shope (1978) called the ‘conditional fallacy.’28 For example, one might devise a case 
where, although S actually knows that p, if she were to reflect on her grounds for 
knowing, she would get so nervous that she would have a heart attack and die 
instantly without ever accessing the grounds rationalizing her knowledge. The 
suggested counterfactual condition is not satisfıed, but S would still know that p. 
Another idea is to say that a ground, g, is reflectively accessible to S for her 
knowledge that p only if an ideal agent, S*, in S’s situation, would have reflective access 
to g. This, however, would be hardly an improvement on the fırst suggestion, 
given that we need a positive reason to believe that the grounds that are available to 
a perfectly rational being will be the same grounds that are available to less-than-
perfect beings like us. In fact, there is reason to think that there is at most partial 
overlap between the set of grounds available to a perfectly rational being and the set 
of grounds available to a less-than-perfect rational being like us. To see that, consider 
the following argument adapted from (Williamson, 2000, p.210). Let p be a logical 
truth and for it to be very probable on our evidence that no one has great credence in 
p. Let h be: no one has great credence in p. It follows that h is very probable on our 
                                                 
28 See (Bonevac, Dever, & Sosa, 2006) for a recent survey of the literature on the 
conditional fallacy. 
  Book Symposium  147 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 41, n. 1, pp. 115-165, jan.-mar. 2018. 
evidence. In contrast to our epistemic situation, a perfectly rational being must give 
high credence to p,29 she must be aware of doing so, and, as a result, she must also 
give very low credence to h and to (ph). But, if this is right, then this being’s 
evidence about it’s own mental states would be different from ours, showing that 
perfectly rational beings cannot have the same reflectively accessible grounds we, 
less-than-perfect beings, have.30 
In sum, it might be argued that Pritchard’s dilemma for modest externalism is at 
best inconclusive and, at worst, flawed. In particular, it is not entirely clear that we 
can have a serviceable enough account of reflectively accessible ground to do the work 
Pritchard needs it to do in his case against modest externalism. Moreover, some 
might argue that this diffıculty makes the immodest take on externalism 
considerably more attractive than Pritchard’s own estimation would lead us to 
believe. However, assessing the plausibility of this latter claim is a task to be pursued 





                                                 
29 This follows from the axioms of the probability calculus and the popular assumption that 
epistemically ideal beings conform their credences to those axioms. 
30 The requirement of reflective accessibility of grounds on rationally grounded knowledge might 
also suffer from what Alvin Goldman called ‘the problem of forgotten evidence’ Goldman 
(1999). For some ps, if I come to acquire rationally grounded knowledge that p in virtue of 
ground g, at time t, then I can still have a rationally grounded knowledge that p at a later 
time, t*, when I have forgotten about g. But, if one has rationally grounded knowledge 
only if one can access the grounds in virtue of which one believes rationally, then it is not 
possible for one to have rationally grounded knowledge that p if one has forgotten one’s 
ground – g is no longer accessible. Thus, the requirement of reflective accessibility of 
grounds on rationally grounded knowledge seems to reduce (perhaps substantially) the scope 
of ordinary knowledge if, as Goldman suggests, we forget the grounds for much of what we 
know. 
31 Gregory Gaboardy, Felipe Medeiros, and Mike Veber have all read and commented on 
different drafts of this paper. I am grateful for their support and insight. I am solely 
responsible for any mistakes that may exist, of course. 
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Duncan Pritchard - Responses to My Commentators 
 
0. Introductory remarks. 
 
I would like to thank my commentators for taking the time to engage with 
my monograph. The dread of an authora sensible author, at any rateis not 
directed at the thought of possible critical scrutiny, but rather at the possibility 
that no-one takes any interest in the work whatsoever. In that spirit, I am 
delighted that there are philosophers out there keen to engage with my work, 
critically or otherwise. 
 
 
1. Response to Salvatore. 
 
Salvatore’s first worry about my anti-sceptical proposal centres on the 
notion of epistemic vertigo that I introduce at the end of the book. As I make 
clear, my biscopic treatment of radical scepticism is of an undercutting variety, 
which means that the two (logically distinct, I claim) putative paradoxes that 
make up the puzzle are shown to not be genuine parades at all. That is, there is 
no fundamental tension within our everyday epistemic notions that the radical 
sceptic has exposed; rather, the sceptical problem, on both of its formulations, 
is trading on contentious theoretical claims that we should abandon. This 
means that there is no sceptical problem to contend with, and hence no need 
for epistemic angst.  
Even so, I do not claim that resolving the sceptical problem returns us to a 
state of epistemic innocence, on a par with those who are ignorant of the 
problem, and that is why I introduce the notion of epistemic vertigo. The crux 
of the matter is that in our everyday inquiries we never become aware of the 
fundamental role that our arational hinge commitments play in our localised 
rational evaluations. As Wittgenstein puts it, they simply “lie apart from the 
route travelled by inquiry.” (OC, §§88)32 As such, although our system of 
rational evaluation is in its nature local, this is never made explicit to us. By 
engaging with the sceptical problem, however, even in such a way as to realise 
why this problem is illusory, one inevitably becomes aware of the role that 
                                                 
32  Note that I am referring to Wittgenstein’s (1969) On Certainty as ‘OC’.  
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hinge commitments play in our system of rational evaluations, and hence one 
also becomes aware of the localised nature of these evaluations. In a sense, a 
kind of epistemic ascent has occurred, whereby we’re viewing our epistemic 
practices from a detached (indeed, I would say unnatural) perspective. I think it 
is this epistemic ascent that leads to the vertigo, in that even once we realise 
that the sceptical problem is illusoryand, in particular, that it is in the nature 
of rational evaluations that they occur relative to a backdrop of arational hinge 
commitments, and hence are essentially localwe might still experience a 
vestige of anxiety about our epistemic position.  
It’s important to reflect on the terminology in play here, however. In 
particular, the use of the phobic term ‘vertigo’ is very deliberate (the pedants 
amongst us can substitute ‘acrophobia’ here if they wish). The idea is that if 
there is an anxiety remaining, it is explicitly phobic because it will run counter 
to what we know full well to be the case. That is, just as one can be high up and 
experience vertigo even though one knows full well that one is not in danger, 
so one can reflect on one’s epistemic position in a certain way (i.e., via the 
epistemic ascent), and experience epistemic vertigo, even while knowing full 
well that there is no epistemic insecurity in play (and thus no cause for 
epistemic angst).  
Salvatore thinks that the anxiety here is more than just a phobic response, 
however, in that he maintains that we should feel epistemic anxiety once we 
realise that our practices of rational evaluation are not full general, but rather 
presuppose arational hinge commitments. I think this is a mistake. In particular, 
it ignores the very important aspect of the Wittgensteinian picture that it is in 
the nature of our system of rational evaluation that it is essentially local in this 
way. As Wittgenstein emphasises at a number of junctures, this is not an 
incidental feature of our rational practices, but rather a matter of (as he puts it) 
of logic (see, e.g., OC, §§341-43). 
Moreover, we also need to remember here that the Wittgensteinian line I 
take is but one part of the biscopic treatment of radical scepticism that I offer. In 
particular, the other key aspect to this treatment of radical scepticismthe 
appeal to epistemological disjunctivismis vitally important to understanding 
why my proposal is not a ‘sceptical solution’ to the problem.33 This is because it 
                                                 
33  For further discussion of epistemological disjunctivism in its own right, see 
Pritchard (2012b).  
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is this component of the biscopic stance that ensures that many of our everyday 
reasons can be factive, and thus that our beliefs enjoy far stronger rational 
support than we hitherto supposed. As I explain in the book, the 
Wittgensteinian and epistemological disjunctivist lines, far from being 
competing approaches, are in fact mutually supporting, in that each view 
becomes more plausible when combined with the other. So, for example, it is 
far easier to accept the idea that rational evaluation is of its nature local if the 
rational support one’s core everyday beliefs enjoy are factive.   
Salvatore’s second critical point concerns epistemic relativism. In particular, 
he argues that by embracing hinge commitments I will be stuck with a radical 
kind of epistemic relativism that I have elsewhere argued is malignant (more 
modest forms of epistemic relativism are, I would argue, benign).34 This is 
epistemic relativism which is committed to there being radically 
incommensurate systems of rational evaluation, such that there can be 
disagreements between members of these two systems that could never, even in 
principle, be rationally resolved.  
Salvatore clearly holds that if there can be any divergence between the hinge 
commitments that we endorse, then radical epistemic incommensurability 
immediately follows. But this is far too quick. In fact, my account of hinge 
commitments is arguably unique among accounts of this kind in being able to 
avoid this entailment. Remember that on my view all hinge commitments are 
expressions of the general über hinge commitment that we all share—viz., a visceral, 
arational certainty that we are not radically and fundamentally in error in our 
beliefs. Once we understand this point, it becomes apparent that our hinge 
commitments are not nearly as heterogeneous as we might have previously 
thought. For example, it may be a hinge commitment of mine that I speak 
English, while it is a hinge commitment of someone raised in China that they 
speak Chinese. This is hardly a divergence in our hinge commitments, however, 
but rather different expressions of effectively the same underlying hinge 
commitment regarding the language that we speak, common to both of us. It is 
just that our different circumstancesour geographical location in this 
casemeans that the über hinge commitment in play manifests itself with a 
specific hinge commitment with a slightly different content. The same goes for 
                                                 
34  See Pritchard (2009; 2010). 
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many of the familiar examples we use (e.g., my name is such-and-such, and so 
on).  
This is not to deny that there can be genuine divergences in one’s hinge 
commitments. Indeed, I suspect religious conviction might be a case in point, 
an issue I’ve explored elsewhere.35 The point is rather to emphasise that a lot of 
what may at first glance look like genuine divergence in our hinge commitments 
is in fact superficial. Moreover, even if it is true that there is some genuine 
divergence in our hinge commitments, radical epistemic incommensurability 
does not immediately follow.  
To see this we need to remember a further feature of my account of hinge 
commitments, again drawn from Wittgenstein’s own remarks. This is the idea, 
which crops up throughout On Certainty, that in order to occupy the space of 
reasons at all, one “must already judge in conformity with mankind.” (OC, 
§156) Wittgenstein clearly had in mind a philosophical viewpoint that we would 
now associate with the holistic form of content externalism later espoused by 
Donald Davidson.36 This is a conception of content such that radically 
departing from the fundamental commitments of those around us is impossible 
because in such circumstances one would fail to articulate meaningful thoughts. 
It follows that we necessarily have substantial overlaps in our hinge 
commitments with those around us.  
Incidentally, I think this is the reason why the river-bed analogy (OC, §§96-
99) that Wittgenstein uses in describing our hinge commitments is the most 
effective at capturing what he’s after. Whereas the ‘hinge’ metaphor brings with 
it the idea of optionality (one can move one’s hinges at will after all), which is 
something Wittgenstein clearly doesn’t want, the river-bed analogy instead 
reminds us of Wittgenstein’s essential communitarianism—i.e., that we are all 
                                                 
35  See in particular my defence of a distinctive Wittgensteinian stance as 
regards the epistemology of religious beliefwhich I call quasi-fideism in 
Pritchard (2011; 2105; 2017; forthcoming). 
36  See, for example, Davidson (1983 [1986]). I explore Davidson’s own stance 
on radical scepticism in Pritchard (2013).  
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being swept along in this river together.37 Yes, there can be change over time in 
one’s hinge commitments, just as in the metaphor what was once part of the 
river-bed can over time become part of the river, and vice versa, but this change 
will inevitably be gradual and piecemeal.  
Moreover, as I explain in the book, on my theory of hinge commitments, we 
can account how disagreements arising out of modest divergences in one’s 
hinge commitments can be resolved rationally. This is because although one’s 
hinge commitments are not directly responsive to rational considerations, they 
are indirectly responsive to such considerations. This follows from the fact that 
individual hinge commitments are expressions of the more general über hinge 
commitment. The path from the former to the latter goes via your wider set of 
beliefs. (Remember here, by the way, that hinge commitments are not beliefs, at 
least not in the sense of that propositional attitude which is a constituent part 
of rationally grounded knowledge anyway, but rather a distinct kind of 
propositional attitude). This is why it is a hinge commitment in normal 
conditions to think that you have two hands, but not when you are coming 
around after having major surgery on your hands that might have led to one of 
them being removed. Once we recognise this point, however, then it becomes 
clear how there can be rational ways of changing someone’s hinge 
commitments over time. In particular, what you need to do is get them to 
change their wider set of beliefs. If you can do that, then over time you can 
change their hinge commitments too.  
In fact, rather than my view facing a problem with epistemic relativism, I 
think it instead gives us practical advice about how to deal with some of the 
most apparently intractable disputes of our day. Take the dispute between 
evolutionary theorists and creationists. Once we recognise that the source of 
this disagreement are very fundamental prior commitments, it becomes clear 
that there is simply no point in either side trying to convince the other ‘head-
on’. That is only going to lead to lots of hot air and neither side budging an 
inch. Rather, the way to deal with such disagreements is to go ‘side-on’. What I 
mean by this is that one should seek out areas of agreement and work on 
maximising that. In doing so, one can gradually inch one’s adversary towards 
                                                 
37  If you think the idea of Wittgenstein as embodying some kind of 
communitarian spirit is implausible, then I urge you to read Tanesini’s (2004) 
wonderful, and unjustly neglected, book on his work.  
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one’s side. Of course, this won’t be an easy process, and the practical 
impediments might be insuperable. But I think that this is entirely to be 
expected—whoever thought that rationally resolving such deep disagreements 
would be easy? The key point, however, is that the practical difficulty of 
rationally resolving deep disagreements is philosophically miles apart from the 
claim that Salvatore is trying to pin on my view—viz., that such disagreements 
could never, even in principle, be rationally resolved.  
I want to close with a very small point of clarification, which is that 
Salvatore mischaracterises my view at one point, in that he attributes to me a 
non-propositional account of hinge commitments. This is not in fact my view. 
Rather, I think that our hinge commitments can be thought of in terms of 
propositional attitudes, while at the same time accommodating the kinds of 
considerations that lead others, such as Salvatore himself, to opt for a non-
propositional view.38 Moreover, this misattribution, while minor, has at least 
one unfortunate knock-on effect, which is that Salvatore also mischaracterises 
why I hold that hinge commitments are not beliefs (in the specific sense of 
‘belief’ outlined above anyway). Salvatore thinks that this follows from my 
commitment to a non-propositional account of hinge commitments, but 
instead it in fact follows from the distinctive kind of propositional attitude that 
is on display with regard to our hinge commitments. In particular, I argue that a 
propositional attitude of endorsement of p which could co-exist with the 
recognition that one has no rational basis for thinking p true is not a belief. 
Given how I describe, following Wittgenstein, hinge commitments, it follows 
that they cannot be beliefs. I think this point that hinge commitments are not 
beliefs is very important, as a failure to distinguish between these two kinds of 
propositional attitude has created all kinds of problems for hinge 
epistemologies, not least in that it has obscured the manner in which such an 
epistemology can deal with the closure-based formulation of radical scepticism 






                                                 
38  See also Moyal-Sharrock (2004).  
154 Book Symposium 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 41, n. 1, pp. 115-165, jan.-mar. 2018. 
2. Response to Veber.  
 
Veder’s first concern about my view is surely one that many philosophers 
would have when they first come across it. For I really am saying that one key 
move we need to make in order to resolve the radical sceptical problem is to 
recognise that our hinge commitments are not in the market for rationally 
grounded knowledge. It follows that there are many claims of which we are 
optimally certain, such as that one has hands, which are not known. And that 
can seem a remarkable thesis at first blush. As Veder once put to me in 
conversation (and I am here paraphrasing), ‘Wait a minute, you’re saying that 
your response to the problem of radical scepticism is to say that you don’t know 
you have hands?’39 
But we need to tread a bit more carefully here. For notice that it is rather 
misleading to gloss my view as merely the claim that our hinge commitments 
are unknown. This is because there is an important sense in which they are 
neither known nor unknown. What I mean by this is that the whole point of the 
Wittgensteinian line I take is that some of our most basic commitments are 
simply not in the market for knowledge. As such, to simply say that they are 
unknown is misleading since it implies ignorance on our part, as if there is 
something that could have been known and we failed to know it. But that’s not 
our epistemic relationship to these commitments at all, since once we 
understand the Wittgensteinian picture of the structure of rational evaluation 
we thereby realise that there is no coherent sense of our hinge commitments 
being the kinds of things that could have been known. I think Stanley Cavell 
(1979, 241) expressed this point very nicely when he noted how, for 
Wittgenstein, the “human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to 
the world as such, is not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as 
knowing.” The key thing is to understand why recognising this is part of the 
resolution of the sceptical problem, rather than a capitulation to it.40 
                                                 
39  This exchange took place at a 2014 summer school hosted by the University 
of Cologne that was devoted to (what was then) the unpublished manuscript of 
Epistemic Angst.  
40  Incidentally, various philosophers over the yearsMarie McGinn, Michael 
Williams, Pen Maddy and Ram Neta spring to mind in this regardhave urged 
me to water-down this part of my view and claim that our hinge commitments 
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It is also important to remember in this regard that, contrary to what Veber 
says, we do not ordinarily take it as given that we know our hinge 
commitments. In fact, as Wittgenstein deftly illustrates, we don’t ordinarily 
consider them at all, but they are rather part of the tacit background relative to 
we consider other things. In fact, it takes a specifically philosophical context to 
introduce consideration of the hinge commitments (i.e., of the relevant 
propositional content, qua hinge commitment; the reason for this caveat will 
become apparent in a moment). Indeed, while there are some unusual everyday 
contexts where we might consider the relevant propositional content at issue, 
this is invariably a context where it has temporarily ceased to be a hinge 
commitment, in which case it is then in the market for knowledge. I gave one 
such example above—in coming around from major surgery on one’s hands, it 
is not a hinge commitment that one has hands, and that’s why you can come to 
know this by seeing your hands. Over time, however, it will drift back into the 
backgrounds and become a hinge commitment again, at which point it will 
again no longer be in the market for knowledge (but also something that you 
won’t ordinarily even consider).  
Veber’s second concern was the compatibility of epistemological 
disjunctivism and my Wittgensteinian account of hinge commitments. 
According to the former, in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge one 
enjoys reflectively accessible factive reasons in support of one’s beliefs. Veber 
finds this puzzling because he takes our hinge commitments to capture 
paradigmatic cases of knowledge, and of course I claim that they are not even 
in the market for knowledge.  
                                                                                                                   
can be knowledge, but just not rationally grounded knowledge. While this 
stance could be made to be broadly consistent with my proposal, I have some 
concerns. For one thing, while I am epistemic externalist about knowledge, and 
hence am willing to allow that one can have knowledge in the absence of 
reflectively accessible rational support, I nonetheless think that some kind of 
virtue-theoretic story needs to be told about where this knowledge comes from, 
and I struggle to see how such a story would pan out in the case of our hinge 
commitments. (Incidentally, the reader who is interested in my wider theory of 
knowledgeknown as anti-luck/anti-risk virtue epistemologyshould consult 
Pritchard (2012a; 2016)).  
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There is in fact no tension here, as is clear if one looks again at how I 
characterise paradigmatic cases in my description of epistemological 
disjunctivism. This is because I make crystal clear that I am concerned with 
cases of perceptual knowledge (and thus of perceptual belief), neither of which, I 
argue, applies to our hinge commitments. I noted above that I don’t think we 
do ordinarily think of our hinge commitment as known, contra Veber. 
(Philosophers might think of them as paradigmatically known, but that’s a 
different matter). A fortiori, on my view it is also the case that I don’t think we 
ordinarily regard them as paradigmatic examples of knowledge either. So the 
putative tension with our ordinary ways of thinking about these epistemic 
matters is illusory.  
Veber’s third criticism is especially interesting. In the book I note that my 
view might seem to be subject to some version of the ‘abominable conjunction’ 
view that is posed for those who deny the closure principle.41 The thought is 
that there will be propositions that I know, and which I know straightforwardly 
entail the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, but where I fail to know the 
latter. Thus we get statements like ‘I know I have hands, but I don’t know that 
I’m not a handless brain-in-a-vat’ that, on the face of it, look very dubious.  
Now I don’t deny the closure principle, but I do argue that our hinge 
commitments, including our hinge commitment that we are not the victims of 
radical sceptical scenarios, are not in the market for knowledge, so it may seem 
like I should face a variant of this puzzle (although the example just cited won’t 
work on my view, as the entailment in question is from one unknowable hinge 
commitment to another unknowable hinge commitment). In the book I argued 
that such conjunctions cease to be puzzling once we have the perspective 
provided by the Wittgensteinian account of hinge commitments. For one thing, 
such conjunctions are not going to be uttered in ordinary contexts, but only in 
specialised contexts where we are doing philosophy, so we should immediately 
be on the alert that they should not simply be taken at face value. Moreover, 
once we have the Wittgensteinian account in play, it becomes apparent that 
what such conjunctions are in fact expressing is (what we have seen to be) the 
harmless fact that our everyday beliefs, which are in the market for knowledge, 
can entail propositions that we are hinge committed to, and hence which aren’t 
                                                 
41  For an early statement of this worry in these specific terms, see DeRose 
(1995). 
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in the market for knowledge. Remember too that it’s not as if in saying that the 
hinge commitments aren’t known that there is anything that we are ignorant of 
here, much less are we indicating that we aren’t committed to their truth (in 
fact, we are optimally certain of it).  
Veber offers a nice twist on the abominable conjunction objection by 
presenting an argument that involves a valid inference from an ordinary known 
belief to a hinge commitment. He argues that I am committed to holding both 
of the premises as being known (the one because it is ordinary known belief, 
the other because it is simply a conceptual truth), but also to treating the 
conclusion as unknown, because it concerns a hinge commitment. It follows, 
he claims, that I am committed to claiming that there can be valid arguments 
with true premises where I don’t know whether the conclusion is true. And 
isn’t that absurd? 
I think this is far too quick. What would be absurd would be denying that a 
sound argument where you accept the premises commits you to the truth of the 
conclusion, but notice that this isn’t what Veber is focussing upon, nor is it 
something that I would need to deny. Indeed, we are optimally certain of our 
hinge commitments, so of course we are committed to their truth, and that 
goes just as much when they feature as conclusions to sound arguments. This 
means that my view has no problem with the idea that sound arguments entail 
true conclusions, but only with the idea that when we have knowledge of the 
premises of a sound argument one must thereby have knowledge of the 
conclusion. I would certainly deny this claim, but I don’t think that denying it 
commits one to absurdity. Indeed, far from it being an awkward consequence 
of my account of hinge commitments, it is in fact directly entailed by it, as 
where a sound argument entails a hinge commitment, it obviously cannot lead 
to knowledge of that conclusion.  
I think the apparent awkwardness of the assertion that one can know the 
premises of a sound argument without knowing the conclusion can be 
explained away. In particular, in simply saying that one doesn’t know the 
conclusion of a sound argument with known premises it can sound as if one is 
both not committed to the conclusion and that one is attributing ignorance of 
this conclusion to oneself (as if one could have known this proposition, but 
failed to). As we have seen, neither of these claims are true when it comes to 
our hinge commitments, and once we make this explicit, and explain the 
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motivation for why the conclusion isn’t known as part of a wider 
Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology, then no absurdity remains.  
 
 
3. Response to Borges  
 
Borges’s main concern is to take issue with how I cast the radical sceptical 
problem in terms of rationally grounded knowledge. My rationale for this is that 
I take mature human knowledge to be clearly of the rationally grounded kind 
(indeed, I think that a lot of this knowledge is rationally grounded in factive 
reasons). That said, I am an epistemic externalist about knowledge, in that I 
don’t think that all knowledge needs to be rationally grounded, albeit I’m an 
epistemic externalist of a modest stripe in that genuine knowledge that lacks a 
rational grounding is on my view rather peripheral (given that mature human 
knowledge tends to be of the rationally grounded kind). So I don’t disagree 
with Borges that there are clear cases of knowledge that don’t have rational 
support (like the veteran fire fighter case that he describes). Modest epistemic 
externalism is in contrast to a more radical form of epistemic externalism which 
claims that most of our knowledge, even of the mature human sort, is lacking 
in rational grounding. I dislike the latter position because I think it is too 
revisionary of our everyday epistemic practices, which clearly do treat most 
knowing subjects as operating within the space of reasons.  
This distinction between modest and radical forms of epistemic externalism 
has a bearing on the sceptical problem in the following way. I take this puzzle, 
in its strongest form, to be claiming that we lack widespread rationally 
grounded knowledge. This means that a modest epistemic externalist like me 
cannot side-step the puzzle by being an epistemic externalist, as of course on 
this view one does have widespread rationally grounded knowledge. So nothing 
is gained from being an epistemic externalist in this sense when it comes to the 
sceptical problematic. In contrast, radical forms of epistemic externalism can 
try to evade the puzzle by claiming that most knowledge is not rationally 
grounded, and hence sceptical attacks on knowledge of this kind are irrelevant. 
I think there are lots of problems facing radical epistemic externalism of this 
kind, but the key issue for our current purposes is that any such strategy is 
inevitably going to be highly revisionary, and hence when applied to the 
sceptical problem will lead to an overriding rather than undercutting approach. 
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In contrast, what I am offering is an undercutting anti-sceptical strategy, and I 
have argued that this is most definitely to be preferred. 
With the foregoing in mind, let’s look at Borges’s objection. I fear that 
something important has gone wrong in his reading of me, since he claims that 
I am opposed to modest epistemic externalism of the kind just described, when 
in fact that is precisely my view about knowledge in general.42 Reading between 
the lines, I think the issue is that because I claim modest epistemic externalism, 
qua a form of epistemic externalism, cannot give us any resources to deal with a 
formulation of the sceptical problem in terms of rationally grounded knowledge 
Borges is inferring that I think there is something amiss with modest epistemic 
externalism itself. But that’s not the case. In fact, as just explained, I endorse 
the view; it’s just that I don’t think it has any bearing on the sceptical 
problematic.43  
Things get murkier once Borges explains what he means by modest 
externalism, which is clearly not what I have in mind. He writes that this 
concerns the view that while all knowledge is rationally grounded, not all 
knowledge enjoys reflectively accessible rational grounds. In a domain like this, 
it is very much a term of art how one wishes to define one’s terms, but for me, 
in Epistemic Angst at any rate, I am quite clear that by rational grounds I mean 
reflectively accessible rational grounds, so the distinction Borges wants to draw 
doesn’t even arise on my view. This is not to say, of course, that one can’t make 
this distinction, but Borges now needs to give us an account of what it means 
for knowledge to be rationally grounded, in a way that is relevant to the 
formulation of the sceptical paradox in hand (as my formulation isn’t in 
                                                 
42  For those interested in my general account of knowledge, which I call anti-
luck virtue epistemology (or, increasingly, anti-risk virtue epistemology), see Pritchard, 
Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4) and Pritchard (2012a; 2016). 
43  In general, as I note in the précis of Epistemic Angst that accompanies this 
response to commentators, I have come to realize that the philosophical task of 
offering a theory of knowledge is orthogonal to the challenge of responding to 
the problem of radical scepticism. Although I still endorse most of what is 
contained in my first monographPritchard (2005)I think that I made the 
mistake there of trying to simultaneously define knowledge and resolve the 
sceptical problematic.  
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dispute, so far as I can tell), such that it doesn’t entail that the rational grounds 
in question are reflectively accessible.  
Given the very thin way that I understand reflective accessi.e., that the 
subject can cite the grounds in question without needing further empirical 
inquiry, as when one defends one’s commitment to p by saying that one can see 
that pI don’t see how this is to be done. What would it even mean to say that 
one has resolved the sceptical problem by showing that one has the rational 
grounds required for knowledge, but that one cannot cite them? And what 
philosophical satisfaction could this stance possibly afford us anyway? The 
point is clear: epistemic externalism is either formulated in a radical fashion that 
requires substantial revisionism, or it is formulated in a modest fashion, in 
which case there is no avoiding the fact that one needs to be able to offer the 





















                                                 
44  While I am grateful to all of my commentators, a special thanks is owed to 
Rodrigo Borges, as he was responsible for putting this symposium together.  
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